Tuesday, 20 December 2011

THE DREAM SNATCHER: A NOVEL IN THE MAKING


A terrible goddess
Smita Kakoty to Dipankar Goswami
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After the way we parted, I would not have written to you at all. But then, your goddess forced me to...
Deep, she scares me-o, toure xapat she does. She wants you back and because you are gone and she can't have you worshipping her in that servile manner of yours, day in and day out, at her doorstep, she's after me now. She thinks I'm responsible for your going away, jano? Ghuri ah na. Come back Deep, come back, please…
She just came in my dream, savage goddess, all naked and bloody. She was Sinnamasta, Kesaikhaiti, whoever, the terrible goddess Kamakhya. She wants my blood if she can't have her mortal lover, her bhakat, her blind worshipper, back…
She blames me. Well, you know what? I blame her too. It's because of her you had to leave me and go back. It's because of her and that blasted book on her. Why couldn't you stay back and write it here? Kio kio kio?
But think about it – she is here, your divine inspiration, and I am here, your mortal lover. Hoine? So why can't you take a bloody sabbatical and come back here and write it here and then go back to wherever you want to and I won't complain? Ahibi ne? Please…
I won't even cling to you again the way I did at the airport and embarrass you in public again, bidda xapat!
Smit
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A terrible goddess (2)
Dipankar.Bhattacharjee to Smita Kakoty
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Debi Debi Debi! :-)
Toi jano Debi, you do not need to use the goddess as an excuse to want me back! If you want me back, you just have to say so, nohoi? And please don’t call the goddess ‘savage’ – since when have you started using such politically incorrect language ;-)
And what do you mean by ‘after the way we parted’ ha? I know I offended you at the airport when I said you were embarrassing me and creating a scene in public, and I am sorry. Mouk khemibi Ai! I would give up anything now to come back and have you cling to me the way you did at the airport, not letting me out of the car. But you know, nohoi, that it is not possible for me to come back immediately? It makes me feel good though to know you will be there waiting so eagerly for me to get back. I told you I shall try my best to finish my book as soon as possible and come back to you. Koisilu ne? We had a deal, so please stick to your side of it and make it easier for me to stick to mine. Let’s both have a little patience – I just reached here, Pagoli!
What is the time there? Ro, against my better judgment, let me call you…
Dipankar
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A terrible goddess (3)
Dipankar.Bhattacharjee to Smita Kakoty
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Debi,
Please forgive me for cutting the line so abruptly. But I cannot stand the deluge your tears force through my veins, Banya. You do not know how it affects me! That is why I do not like to call you – you always cry on the phone! I warned you just the other day that if you keep crying like this, I will be forced to give up my book, my job, everything and come back to you immediately. And you had said that you do not like people who compromise on their work for whatever reason. Koisili ne?
You would hate me for leaving my work and going back, believe me. You might not feel that way now, but if I go back, I will come in your way – you will not be able to do your work the way you are used to and you will hate me, moi janu. I know how much you love your work, being among your ‘own people’ (my possessive princess, I love the way you make everything your own).
If not, then why are we apart at all? You refused to apply for the jobs I asked you to consider here, toi jano. And if I go back, you might not want to work in the field, or worse, feel obliged not to because of me. I have no right to do that, Aijoni. You would wither away if you were to be in the city all the time, my little mountain flower. Ai o, you should stay where you can blossom, and where they need your soft touch of compassion. I know I need your touch and feel myself, but I cannot be so selfish as to ask you to uproot yourself from where you belong, and either stay permanently in Guwahati – in the event of my going back to live there – or here, with me in this distant city where there is neither love nor companionship.
I’m living in the hope that soon, sometime very soon, I shall be able to wrap up my cosmetic life here and come back there where your beauty and fragrance is. Till then, Debi, have patience and do not make it more difficult for me than it already is, please.
Reply now,
Dipankar
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A terrible goddess (4)
Smita Kakoty to Dipankar.Bhattacharjee
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So you would like to have me cling to you now, hoi?
Why did you laugh at me about the goddess scaring me then, ko?
Why did you hang up on me, ko ko?
If you hate to hear me cry, why do you leave me, ha?
Would you have clung to me like I cling to you, ko etia?
Ko ko ko?
You would not, Deep. And there lies the difference. I think I’ll always need you more than you will ever need me. You are so bloody self-sufficient with your books and your courses and your goddess. It's almost like I am there and yet, not there. I know. Aw, moi janu, moi janu, moi janu.
And please don't use my work as an excuse for your not coming back here...... 
I can't take it anymore Deep. This strain is too much. How long will this go on? Me looking forward for so so so long to seeing you, meeting and finally feeling alive after months of numbness, and then, xeiyya! time for you to leave again. And me crawling back into the grave once more.
Once more, and I swear I will die. It takes a heavy toll, Deep, very heavy. Moi nauaru aru.
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A terrible goddess (5)
Smita Kakoty to Dipankar.Bhattacharjee
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Oi old man,
I was sleepy and depressed last night when I wrote you that mail, biuso? And very very grumpy. And I had not read all the things you had written too. Boliya neki? Me a mountain flower! Moi? You have lost it, burha. Stop romanticizing me - I have told you that often enough, hoi ne nohoi? I don't live in any mountain though I might have been born on a hill - I love hills - and I’m not some Florence Nightingale figure to my people, jani tho. But my people are mine alright J, like the mountains are mine, like the river, the old man river, my Luit, my Brahmaputa, is mine, like you are mine, like everything I see is mine. Mour mour mour! Like that old imposing majestic Ahat tree is mine - the one I showed you on our way to Mangaldoi last time... hmmm... so many things are mine, but the one thing of mine that I really really want at this moment is not here with me. You are gone, Deep, and I can't believe it yet...
But that's beside the point, thik ase? The point is, if you hate your cosmetic life so much why don't you just leave it behind and come back? Asalate Deep, you are too comfortable out there to ever want to come back. Cosmetic or not, it is the life you prefer, and it suits your personality. It would be doing an injustice to want you to come back just because I can't live without you. And I can't leave here. Mane, give me a break aru, I just got back. All those years wasted trying to build a professional career, away from the one place I should have never left! I didn't leave that life and my career behind on the mainland, in Delhi, to drop it all again and go back where I don't belong dei. I finally feel like I am doing something I should have been doing all my life.
And so we are stuck - you in cold cold London, and me here - only I don't mind being where I am. And I couldn't leave, and I know you can't either. We were both never cut out for a conventional relationship I guess…Budhoi, we are destined to be this way forever, unless… unless you suddenly realize you can't do without me at all and come back!
Stop-gap is the word that comes to mind when I think of our situation, but we cannot go through life in this way forever. I do not want a stop-gap relationship, certainly not with you, the best thing to have happened to me in a long long time... Aiow, I'm going to die, or cry, or both. Jau etia, bye,
Smit
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A terrible goddess (6)
Dipankar.Bhattacharjee to Smita Kakoty
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Debi,
Who ARE you, really? Debi ne manuxi? Goddess, woman or child? What drastic transformation from petulant intractable child to insightful psychoanalyst! But that is so typically you J - wanting one moment to be petted like a baby and seducing me the next like a profligate! Don’t I remember it all, Mayabini? And then one minute you are close to tears because I am reading on Kamakhya and you think I pay more attention to the goddess than to you, and the next minute, you scream and shout at me and want me to leave you alone because you do not want me intruding upon your poetry. You make me go through so many emotions at the same time, Majoni, I never know what to expect from you next.
Nobody, but nobody, has ever managed to make me feel this way. Xasai koisu! Ture xapat! What I feel for you, Debi, is not one tenth of what I have felt for anybody in my entire life, and two months together this time only made me feel how fortunate I am to have you in my life. You could have anybody you want, Goddess, but you chose an ancient relic like me; a staid old professor who writes books and cannot (or will not, which is worse I suppose) participate in your noble work of bringing succour to your people. I really admire your breadth of heart, Aijoni, and I love you, like no man can ever love you.
But what makes you think that I’m too comfortable here? Ko sun. And that our relationship is only stopgap? Why do you feel this way, Xounjoni? We did make provisions for a future this time by buying the apartment, didn’t we? I’m sorry I couldn’t give you the tiny Assam-type house with the huge garden in front that you wanted. Could we perhaps have waited and looked around some more? Toi ki kawo? But there just wasn’t enough time - the two months just flew past. And you know, Moina, that you would not have had the time to tend to the garden. It would have become a jungle out there, and whenever you were back from the field, it would have taken all your time and energy to clear it up. And by the time it was cleared, you would have had to leave again. Maybe it was for the best we bought the apartment. Now that I know I have a home to go back to, I’m all the more keen to complete the project as soon as possible and return – hopefully for good this time. We both know we are not a conventional couple what with our age difference and the physical distance between us, but that only sets us apart from the rest, nohoi janu? I promise you, Debi, we will soon be together. Xapat khai koisu.
My editor has already called about the book and I need to now sit down and organize my notes from all the spadework that I did on this trip. As soon as I have organized my data a little, I can begin with my first chapter. And once again, Debi, I am warning you, please do not get upset with me if I switch off completely for long periods. I need to do that while writing. I know you did say you will understand, but I am always so scared of hurting you with my insensitivity, jano? I’m scared that being day in and day out with the insensate books and rowdy crowd of students here at the university, I might have become too insensitive myself. And you are such a delicate sensitive thing.
I wonder when I see the young people here, what you would have been like at their age. Somehow I cannot see you as someone who could ever have been anything but extraordinary, standing out among all the other students. And yet, I do not remember you from my Cotton College days. But then again, maybe that is not so surprising considering the vast divide between the teacher and the taught that exists in our society. I should have known better than to follow this hierarchical set-up at Cotton, having breathed the comparatively freer air of JNU, but it was my first job and I fell into the trap, trying to mould in. Ki korim aru? Feels funny now that I should have fallen in line with such a demoralizing tradition. Debi, jano, a very wise man had told me once during one of my field interviews that notwithstanding all the positive contributions of the Xankari religion and tradition – without which no doubt there would have been no Axamiya culture as we know it now - it has also given us the debilitating culture of guru-worship and a servile mentality to go with it. Despite all its democratic inclinations in relation to civil society, the Vaishnavite culture yet upheld a kind of intellectual hierarchy. We should have got rid of it a long time back, dei.
Having taught here all these years now, I often wonder if I could not have stayed back in Assam and tried to change things myself to whatever little extent I could. It really must have been the preaching-from-the-podium stance that I unquestioningly accepted along with my appointment as a lecturer at the time that made interaction between us impossible. Hobo pare. But I also wonder whether it wasn't for the best that we met the way we did eventually. Hoi hoi, it was certainly for the best that we did not meet then, or who knows but that given my tendency at the time to give in to tradition, I would not have - like some of my illustrious colleagues - pulled you, my student, out of the classroom and married you? I would have smothered you, my delicate Xewali. How old were you then? 17? 18? You are still so much a child in so many ways.
But just look at the length of this mail! Now I know I am ready to start writing my book J I have got into my writing mode and I believe this is a sign from the goddess that I should not delay the process any further. Moromi, you accuse me of being in love with the goddess. But I can't help it. If one is from Assam, I really believe, one is somewhere touched by the goddess. And I don’t mean this in a religious sense, toi jano. It’s just that Kamakhya is so intricately connected with all aspects of the region - be it history, mythology, politics, popular imagination... but you know this as well as I do, my poetess, nohoine? Your poem on the goddess still haunts me, you used such powerful imagery in it. After all, it was our long debates over the poem that launched our relationship. You of course feel she is the cause of all bloodshed. But as I have always told you, I want you to look beyond that. Stop accusing the goddess, Debi, be friends with her and you will see as much of her as I do: maybe more, kune jane, because you feel more acutely than anybody I have ever met. Don’t let her remain the subject of a passing frenzy of strong feelings, which was what your poem was all about. Nai nai!
Write back soon, Xounjoni, and take care,
Dipankar
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A terrible goddess (7)
Smita Kakoty to Dipankar.Bhattacharjee
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Aw sure, hoi tu, take her side. Why not? She was your first love – I come a distant second, nohoi janu? J
But let’s not fight today – or ‘debate’ as you will no doubt correct me: Debi, we are not fighting, just debating, like two individuals who have different perspectives on the same thing ;-) Today, I am very happy – not completely happy abasye – how can I be without you here – but as happy as I can be under the circumstances. I am happy because I am going back to the field after a long long time! Jit just called again – last night when he called I told him I was sleeping – moi bor beya manuh dei – when I was actually sitting and writing to you, heh heh! I don’t want anybody coming between you and me – even if we only have a chain of emails tying us together now….
But no, we are venturing into depressing territory again. I was telling you something about being happy. O, Jit called – not that that in itself made me happy aru – I talk to him every day at work – but what he said made me very happy. It reminded me of Bishnu Rabha…
After all, it was Bishnu Rabha and people like him – like say, Jyotiprasad Agarwala – who kept the dialogue between the various communities of Assam alive, nohoine, and thus promoted the peaceful coexistence and co-mingling of all the peoples of the region based not on the hegemony or domination of one particular language, religion or community, but on a natural evolutionary symbiotic relationship?
Wondering where that came from? Let me explain, xun.
Jit and all had gone to the Bongaigaon relief camps again last week like I told you (when you had said, I feel bad that you have to stay back only because I am here, as if I could sacrifice those last few precious moments I had left with you, mane!) and they went to two of the camps, and the people in both places were asking about me. Jit says at the Adivasi camp in Kalabari, the people remembered me as ‘the woman who told us to talk, talk, talk’ – amak kotha kobole kuwa manuh joni, because I used to sit with them every evening – Gomati, Jit, Nilima and Prasen da would also join us – and over some haria that they brewed and a few bottles of rum that Prasen da never seems to run out of, we would encourage them to talk to us about themselves, about their lives before and after the riots, about everything. I used to tell them that talking is therapeutic – xasa katha nohoine? – and that they should start talking not just to us but to the Bodo people living near the camp also. It would help heal the wounds, I’d told them. I’d also told them that talking to each other would help build mutual trust and understanding, and provide a common platform of give and take, prevent further lacerations.
Jano Deep, I have often felt that during the years he was underground, Rabha had most effectively initiated such a dialogue between communities, going from village to village, hiding there (but not so effectively of course, since everybody in the village and in all the surrounding villages came to see him wherever he was supposed to be hiding J), and talking to them, inviting them to talk to him and to each other. I am always reminded of that scene from Medini Choudhury’s account of his life in Pherengadao, where he is sitting surrounded by all those villagers one night, everybody drinking freshly brewed rice beer (was it joumai?) and talking to them, educating them, rousing them... And there must have been so many nights like that, so many villages visited, so many villagers involved, so much camaraderie instilled. I wish I could do something like that someday, but there is already so much poison in the minds of our people for one another, often it seems like an impossible task...
But no, I won’t be depressed today! Nai, nai!
You know what the Adivasi people at Kalabari had said to me at the time? They had not seemed to take my suggestion too well – they had said the Bodos were the people who had killed their friends and families and snatched away their lands and livelihoods, how can there be any conversation with them? Some of them had become quite angry at my suggestion, jano. But it seems at least they remember. They remember what I’d said, so there’s still hope, hobola
And they remember me, Deep – it feels so good when people remember you-o – it makes you feel like you have left something of yourself behind and grown beyond your limitation as just one person, one being – it’s almost like you are scattered all over those places where you are remembered and you have escaped the confines of having to be just one – you can be so many, and in so many places. It makes me feel like god, one but not one! (Talking of one god, remind me to give you a talking to about your ideas on the Xankari one-god-one-refuge tradition sometime soon! I’m not in the mood to ‘debate’ today.)
Is it too conceited of me, Deep, to feel like god? Well, I don’t feel omnipotent like him – on the contrary, I feel quite helpless when I can’t do anything for all these people who are suffering – but it does make me feel expansive, bistrita, unlimited… However, it’s not much good to feel like god, if you can’t do anything much, ki labh? There is so much I want to do for these people, Deep, and so little that I can! Sometimes I feel like I know exactly what it is that needs to be done to bring peace to my Assam, my home, my Northeast, and to set everything right – everything that has gone wrong beginning with the misguided ethnic and nationalist politics of the region and the mishandling of indigenous aspirations and settler problems. But when I sit down to think what it is that actually needs to be done, in practical terms, I just can’t put my finger on it! I feel so helpless then, and not in the least like god... Why is god so smug anyway? He is not very good either, nor is he just. Nohole why should there be some people who suffer so much – 12 years in a relief camp is no joke, and ‘relief’ is quite a misnomer here, believe me – while others sit in comfortable newly-bought fancy apartments and complain about their stop-gap love lives? These people have been living stop-gap, make-shift lives for more than a decade now, Deep, and they don’t have much of a future to look forward to either! Can you imagine you or me being able to do that?
I hate Sunil, and his self-righteous mainland airs - 'so, have you ever been to Delhi?' he asked me the day I first met him about the job, like I haven’t lived if I haven’t seen Delhi – you should have seen the look on his face when I said I hated Delhi so much, I’d left my job there and come back and never wanted to go back there again J I also know he is part of the whole money-making NGO racket, but so long as he and his organization gives me the opportunity to work among my people, I will stick on.
But I’m really glad I have such good colleagues to work with, dei. Jit just said that they all loved you – Smitr burhatu: ‘Smit’s old man’ – and said to tell you they will take care of me while you are away – not to worry. He probhu, everybody thinks I'm quite incapable of looking after myself , seh! And here I am wondering how I can change the destiny of an entire nation and so many communities. Si si!
Am I a fool, Deep? I think I am, because every time I try thinking with my head, I end up using my heart. One can't think straight when one is thinking through their heart, pare janu? And here again I am being like the man I love – like Bishnu Rabha. Didn’t Goswami saarmane Praphulla Dutta Goswami saar – write that he was not at all in touch with reality, that he lived in a romantic bubble he created for himself? I was very angry with saar when I read it the first time, but now I think he wasn’t all that wrong. The good that Rabha did while he was alive has no parallel, but he did not make any provisions for his good work to live on. Asalate, I think that he never thought he was doing anything but what he felt like, and that what he felt like doing was the very thing that our people needed then. It is also the very thing that we still need, only he is no more and his legacy has been corrupted and co-opted. Hoi, he was too much of a romantic to realise that after he was dead, he and his life and work could be used any which way by every vested interest section of our society.  The dominant Axamiyā community will use him – a Bodo – as their brand ambassador, their cultural icon when it suits them, but dominate over all the other communities that Rabha considered a part of the greater Axamiyā nation, including the Bodos. There are those who will use his rousing lyrics – O Axamiyā deka dal/Aji toure tejal badan malin kio hol? – to awaken the sleeping chauvinistic spirits of the younger generation, but forget that Rabha’s politics was one of inclusion and integration, not one of exclusion. They consider his politics dangerous, because it might put an end to the conflicts that have proved so lucrative for a section of the elites, where thousands died so that a few could fulfil their political ambitions and greed for more funds, more money that could line their pockets. And so he lives on in bits and pieces – adharuake – in the Axamiyā mind as the kalaguru, the master of arts, his politics conveniently forgotten. Maybe it’s his idealism that we need most now, Deep, ne ki kawo? If your politics is about the people, can you ever be anything but a romantic?
I do try not to be too romantic and idealistic about things myself, Deep, and you are my inspiration, you who have a breadth of intellect I have never seen in anybody else. Of course, I have my differences with you, and I don't think you think right in many cases (especially about egalitarianism in Xankari culture – I MUST talk to you about that soon), holeu... I love you all the same. It's nice we bought the apartment, and when I return from this field trip, I will be coming back to my own home, it will no longer be rented place. Thank god Das khura wanted to sell the house to us. I hate having to shift things around, though I feel like that's what I have been doing all my life. At least, all my adult life. Sometimes it's fun - you know- all the romanticism surrounding a jajabori life – I love the life of a vagabond. But sometimes, it can be very tiring... I know I give this line to my Ma all the time - about being settled in unsettled-ness. Kintu ketiaba, just sometimes, not too often though, fatigue sets in from all these mental and physical wanderings. Am I growing old? This time at least, I will be coming home to OUR home and I will have the memory of your presence to keep me warm. ummmmmmm...
Abasye, I would have loved to have my Assam-type house with the garden in front as well... AND DONT YOU DARE SAY ANYTHING ABOUT JUNGLES! I LOVE JUNGLES. SO WHAT IF WE HAD A JUNGLE IN OUR FRONT YARD? I WOULD ACTUALLY LOVE THAT. You know I hate order. And jungles are so chaotic, you could get lost in them. I love getting lost. The thrill of finding yourself again is like being reborn... Will you go looking for me if I ever got lost Deep? I would love to be reborn in your arms... xosake!
Deep, Deep, I love you so much-o. I have loved you since the first day I saw you in the Social Anthropology class so many years ago. You didn't know that nohoi? It was one of those crushes you have on your teacher and moon over them in class and pay no attention to anything that is being taught and watch with dreamy eyes the slight tilt of their head or the gestures of their hands and imagine them – a la Indiana Jones – rushing off into some wild adventure fraught with danger and peril and wish someday you will grow up to be a world famous academic and meet them in some international conference where they have come to talk about their latest finding and your eyes will meet across the conference table and the spark will be ignited and you will meet up later and that will be the beginning of a passionate love affair…
I’d always thought myself to be above silly, girly crushes, and so I had never told anybody about it, not even you – mane, I mean, it’s too embarrassing! Then one day, when I was in my third year BA in Delhi University, there was this notice up in our college notice board which said “Talk by Professor Dipankar Goswami at the Arts Faculty today on ‘Worship of the Female Principle and Shaktism in Assam’”. And I thought, ‘So he’s left Cotton College and is teaching in some vague university in the UK now, in some department of antiquarian studies or whatever. Hmmmmmmmmm….’ And I dismissed my dreams of ever meeting you because I did not ever want to go to the UK. I even resisted going for your talk that day, although those days I never used to miss any event that featured Assam and the Northeast. And you had very nearly slipped out of my mind – like all childhood and teenage fantasies do eventually – when we met in JNU at the Parthasarathi Rock again…
And now I’m tired of writing and writing and writing. So I’ll stop. Aru aru aru... Aru ki kom ko? Ja, I'll write to you when you mail me next and tell me about what you have done on your book so far. I won’t mind if you switch off, so long as you don’t start panicking and calling up my friends about my whereabouts while I am in the field. I shall most probably be leaving next week, and this time I might be gone for two weeks or more, thik ase?
Love you old man, jatna lobi
Smit
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Ethnic Conflicts and conflict resolution: A Study of Axamiyā, Bodo and Koch in Assam


Introduction
Since the formation of the Indian state in 1947, the Northeast region of the country has seen numerous violent conflicts of varying intensity. As a region which ‘challenges the separation of the colonial from the national’, the nature of these conflicts have ranged from mass civil disobedience movements engendered by long-standing grievances against the State to armed militancy aimed at secession from the State. But practical experience has shown that instead of addressing the ‘underlying conflict causes’ the State has often responded to them with large scale militarization and a strategy of co-optio of the influential sections within the conflict parties. This has led to the manifestation of new conflicts and exacerbation of old ones rather than to their settlement, resolution, or transformation. And these new conflicts have been directed not just against the State and its various agencies and actors, but have also led to violence between the numerous communities that constitute the multi-cultural, poly-ethnic mosaic of the region.
It would however be naïve to attribute the entire burden of responsibility for the ethnic conflicts in the Northeast upon the State – or its policies towards the region. The complex nature of the ethno-national conflicts that have ravaged the Northeast during its ‘post’-colonial career needs to be studied in a more historicized manner. After all, the State’s policy of co-option could succeed in driving wedges between and within the ethnic communities only because traditional rivalries and existent fissures lent themselves readily to being exploited in this manner. This study will look at these fault lines and fissures and explore how they have been exploited to make latent conflicts manifest. A better understanding of this conflict dynamics, it is hoped, will facilitate an informed approach among those involved in addressing, studying and participating in the mechanisms of peace-building and conflict transformation in the region. The researcher  begins by exploring the intricacies of ethnic relations – historical and contemporary, conflictive and cooperative – with special reference to Assam which, though just one of the seven states of the Northeast, lies at the heart of the region. It is divided into 10 chapters, the first of which gives an overview of the conflicts in Assam before going into the history of the conflicts raging between and within the ethnic communities living there.

Conflicts in Assam: A Brief History

The history of ‘post’-colonial Assam is a history littered with many conflicts – linguistic, political and economic – between the autochthons[1] of Assam and the many settler communities that had been coming into Assam following the colonial rule. It is interesting to trace how the settler-indigenous conflicts that had united the various ethnic and autochthonous communities under a nativist banner, could not keep these communities united for too long. The autochthonous communities soon turned on each other and conflicts between them – some of a manifestly violent nature – broke out in Assam. This is a study of the conflicts between the Axamiyā, Bodo and Koch-Rajbangsi communities in particular.
When the British were withdrawing and Assam decided to join the Indian Union, those at the helm of running the State in its nascent stage did not foresee conflicts arising along ethnic and/or indigenous lines. In Assam, the Axamiyā people had begun to assert their nationalistic aspirations in the 19th and 20th centuries, when Assam began to be shaped as an integral part of the Indian nation. But once the Indian State was formed, it was not long before grievances surfaced among the Axamiyā leadership in ‘post’-colonial Assam against the perceived ‘step-motherly’ treatment of the State. The grievances peaked in the 1970s after the formation of Bangladesh as a nation and the inability/reluctance of the Indian State to stop the flow of refugees into Assam. Continued illegal influx of populations from the neighbouring country raised fears of demographic swamping and loss of identity among the Axamiyā people whose resentment found expression in a mass civil disobedience movement that started in 1979. The movement which came to be known as the Assam Movement lasted till 1985 and ended with the signing of the Assam Accord in that year. Simultaneously with the mass movement, the period also saw the birth of the armed militant group, United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA).
While the ULFA continues its armed movement based on the idea of an independent federal Assam where all ethnic communities of Assam – and even the settler communities – can co-exist, the Assam Movement had the exactly opposite impact on the interethnic fabric of Assam. It marked the period when every small and big ethnic group began distancing itself from the Axamiyā identity and subsequently started placing demands for separate ethnic homelands. Since the formation of the Axamiyā nation, the Axamiyā-speaking Hindu middle class had been in the forefront of the nation building process and it had traditionally assumed an attitude of cultural superiority and social dominance over the other ethnic groups. This had started a process of gradual erosion of the interethnic identity that had been building up in Assam over the past so many centuries. When the Indian Union was formed, and the Axamiyā middle class became its ‘political sub-contractor’ in the Northeast, this process gained momentum. By 1985, the breaking point had been reached and the smaller ethnic groups began to assert their own distinctive identities and nationalist demands.
In spirit, the Assam Movement had set out to demand that the Indian State should take concrete measures to stop the illegal influx of the illegal Bangladeshi immigrants, who were the bidexis, or foreigners. Gradually however, it became more and more xenophobic in nature and demanded the ouster of all ‘Ali Kuli Bangali, Nak Sepeta Nepali’ where Ali stands for the East Bengali (later Bangladeshi) Muslim peasant, Kuli for the tea garden laborers brought into Assam in large numbers by the British from parts of mainland India, Bangali for the Hindu Bengalis, and Nak Sepeta Nepali for the ‘flat-nosed’ Nepalis whose immigration into Assam had also begun during the British period. Despite the fact that early migrants from most of these communities had already embraced the Axamiyā language and identity, parochial Axamiyā elements took control of its agenda and all bahiragatas or outsiders – that is, non-autochthonous peoples – were seen as threatening the land, livelihood, language and identity of the Axamiyā community in varying measures, and depriving the ‘sons of the soil’ of their due.
As the Movement progressed, its agenda came to be hijacked by the ethnic elite among the Axamiyā Hindu middle class which actively propagated the idea that ‘sons of the soil’ referred only to the Axamiyā-speaking Hindu community, and at places launched attacks even on other autochthonous indigenous and ethnic communities. The Movement therefore became a turning point in defining the relations of the dominant Axamiyā Hindus with all other communities of Assam, indigenous and settler. The process of alienation and proliferation of new identity movements gained momentum, and post-1985, rumblings of ethnic separatism were being heard. Two years later, in 1987, the Bodo Movement (1987-2003) for a separate homeland was launched.
The Bodo Movement marked the complete separation of the Axamiyā identity from its indigenous roots and invalidated its true historical nature and cultural heritage. The insider-outsider rhetoric took on a completely different turn and although sentiments against immigrant communities continued escalating, conflicts within the autochthonous communities also grew simultaneously and exponentially.
The Bodo Movement took place in two phases: the first phase lasted between 1987 and 1993, when a settlement was proposed by the Assam government in the form of the Bodoland Autonomous Council (BAC) Act signed between the state government and the All Bodo Students’ Union (ABSU) and the Bodo Peoples’ Action Committee (BPAC) which gave leadership to this phase of the Movement.  The second phase started with the failure of the initial settlement in 1993 and lasted till 2003 when the Memorandum of Settlement on Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) was signed with the militant Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT). Despite its stated non-violent nature, the movement turned violent in pockets and nativist militant groups like the ABSU-Volunteer Force (ABSU-VF) and the BLT were formed. The National Democratic Front of Boroland (NDFB) was also formed in 1986 and its stated aim was the formation of a ‘sovereign’ Bodoland. Unlike the NDFB however, for the ABSU and the BLT, separatism was never an option and even their vocabulary always remained within the confines of constitutionally sanctioned demands.
The 2003 Bodo Accord gave enormous legislative, financial and executive powers to the Bodo leadership. It provided for minimum interference by the state government in the functioning of the autonomous council formed through an amendment of the Sixth Schedule, thus giving it a constitutional status. Flushed with funds that the state government had no control over except in its disbursal, the Bodoland Autonomous Territorial District (BTAD) was envisaged as having powers equivalent to a state with only the constitutional status of being one not granted. As part of the agreement reached between the government and the BLT leadership, general amnesty was announced for all its cadres. BLT chairman, Hagrama Mohilary, became the chief executive of the BTC in 2005. Currently, his party, the Bodo Peoples Front (BPF), has entered into a seat-sharing agreement with the current Assam government. On the face of it therefore, the Bodo-Axamiyā conflict has been resolved at a certain level.
The creation of the BTAD however, brought the Bodo as well as the Axamiyā communities into conflict with the Koch-Rajbangsis. The Bodo community especially has vehemently opposed the Koch-Rajbangsi community’s main demands – for being enlisted as a Scheduled Tribe (ST) in the Indian constitution and for the creation of a separate homeland of Kamatapur. The Koch-Rajbangsi community has yet to launch a sustained movement like the Assam or the Bodo Movements, and its political demands are yet to attain the intensity of overt violence and widespread political mobilization. However, over and above a few political parties, the community also has a strong students’ union – the All Koch Rajbongshi Students’ Union (AKRSU) – and students’ unions have traditionally been the main mobilising force behind most political action in Assam and the Northeast as a whole.
Since the 1990s which saw the birth of most of the major organizations that are currently fighting a political battle for the rights of the community in North Bengal, the Koch-Rajbangsi organizations is Assam also have become politically more vocal and active. The AKRSU was formed in 1993 in Assam, and after the formation of the Kamatapur People’s Party (KPP) in 1996 and of the Greater Koch Bihar People’s Association in 1998 in North Bengal, it joined forces with these organizations to intensify its political mobilization. In 2008, a faction of the AKRSU contributed to the formation of a joint forum of the Koch-Rajbangsi populations of Assam and North Bengal – the Greater Kamata United Forum – to overcome the difficulties inherent in fighting a united battle by a community divided by administrative boundaries, political affiliations and constitutional statuses. In any case, even if they are not directly part of a joint forum, most other Koch-Rajbangsi organizations of Assam have been extending their support to the organizations of North Bengal.
The Kamatapur State Demand Committee (KSDC) was subsequently formed as an umbrella organization of several Koch-Rajbangsi organizations including the AKRSU, AAKRS, Chilarai Sena, All Koch Rajbangshi Mahila Samiti, Koch Rajbongshi Sahitya Sabha, All Kamatapur Students’ Organisation, Greater Coochbehar Democratic Party, Greater Coochbehar People’s Association, KPP, and so on. More and more, the Koch-Rajbangsi people in the BTAD are getting restive. A few organizations of the community in the BTAD have since organized themselves under the Koch Rajbongsi United Forum (KRUF), a conglomeration of around 10 Rajbangsi organizations, to intensify their stir for a separate state of Kamatapur. Demanding that a separate Kamatapur state be carved out of Assam and North Bengal and Scheduled Tribes status be given to the community, the KRUF held a rally in Kokrajhar on 15 November. Stray incidents of violence were reported in the course of the rally as in the course of most of the other programs of political protest undertaken by the representative organizations of the community. For the most part however, the community leaders have resorted to democratic means in the course of their demand for a desired constitutional status and a separate homeland.
Meanwhile, a Koch-Rajbangsi militant organization, the Kamatapur Liberation Organisation (KLO), was formed in 1995 which is demanding, among other things, the formation of a sovereign State of Kamatapur, independent of the Indian Union. Although not very strong in terms of cadre or arms strength, the idea of militant nativism it espouses has earned the KLO considerable support among the community. Many of the overtly political organizations have also been alleged to have close links with the armed group. ‘Post’-colonial Assam history has shown that the presence of an armed group to represent a particular ethic group has invariably been a recipe for wide scale violence sooner or later. This study wishes to explore whether there is any scope for reconciliation between the ethnic groups in conflict before manifest violence breaks out between them.
As it stands, experience has shown that the conflict settlement/resolution methods that have been adopted so far have failed to heal historical wounds between communities. What is more, they seem to have failed in more ways than one if the large scale violence that continues unabated in BTAD is anything to go by. Some amount of this violence is of course the result of the ongoing political agitation launched by the Koch-Rajbangsi community. For the most part however, this violence is the result of conflicts within the Bodo community in the aftermath of the 2003 settlement.
When elections to the newly created BTAD were announced, the ABSU-BLT combined leadership floated a new political party, the Bodo People’s Progressive Front (BPPF), to fight elections from a common platform. However, during the process of selecting candidates to stand in the elections, splits surfaced and factionalism reared its head within the leaders of the community. The party split into two groups not long after its formation – the BPPF headed by UG Brahma, a former ABSU leader and parliamentarian, and the BPF headed by Hagrama Mohilary. As a result of the split, newer incidents of violence were witnessed leading up to and during the first elections held in 2005.
Meanwhile the NDFB, which had been demanding secession from the Indian union, had always been opposed to the BLT, the surrendered leaders of which group subsequently gained power over the BTC. One of the major reasons for this opposition was that it was widely alleged that the BLT had been propped up by the central government of India to destabilize a regional party-led government in Assam and to foment ethnic conflicts in the state. The NDFB which was anti-India in its stated intent thus had a huge ideological difference with the BLT. This difference between the two groups exacerbated after the formation of the BTAD and widespread internecine violence broke out.
Following a further split in the ranks of the NDFB engineered by the Indian government’s call to bring the rebels of the outlawed group to talks, violence between the pro- and anti-talks factions of the NDFB have also been on the rise. The BTAD is today one of the most violent regions in Assam with more than a hundred persons being killed in the area in 2009 alone (Dainik Agradoot 2010). In February 2010, the Indian Home Secretary GK Pillai has also been reported as expressing concern over the large number of illegal arms in currency in the BTAD (Asomiya Pratidin 2010). Most of these arms were retained by the former BLT cadres although they had surrendered and been granted amnesty by the government. These weapons found their way to more than 200 youth camps that came up in the BTAD subsequently and despite efforts by government and security agencies to seize these arms, the exercise does not seem to have been very successful.

Challenges of Working in a Conflict Zone

Such an atmosphere of continued violence has posed some major challenges for this study which has been based on fieldwork conducted primarily in the four districts under the administration of the BTC – Kokrajhar, Chirang, Baksa (Bagsha) and Udalguri in western and northern Assam. Chapter 2 discusses the field area which is one of the most volatile and conflict prone areas of Assam. It also provides brief ethnographic sketches of the communities in conflict that have been studied in the case study area. The choice of these communities has mainly been dictated by the fact that tracing the relationship between them over the course of Assam history can help us understand how intricate and often intertwined the process of ethnic and national identity formation can be. Despite such close ethnic proximity the fact that ethnic differentiation takes place and conflicts arise, are created and exacerbated between these communities demonstrates the complexity of the politics behind the process. Three communities with such close historical, ethnological and cultural ties which have traversed the entire gamut of co-existence: domination, assimilation, reversal of assimilation, conversion, conflict, and political reconciliation, undoubtedly make for the best cases to study. What is more, they provide the researcher with the opportunity to study not just the dynamics of conflicts between communities but also to explore how these conflicts and state and non-state interventions have created other, more complex dynamics of intra-community conflictive relationships. In the case of the Koch community’s relationship with the Bodo and Axamiyā, the conflicts are yet to conflagrate beyond a certain point. Many of the differences are as yet latent, but if they are not addressed urgently and with empathy and promptness, they may lead to the kind of violent manifest conflict that has characterized the Axamiyā-Bodo relation for decades now. No study of ethnic relationships in Assam will be complete without an exploration of these latent conflicts and the means to diffuse them.
The political and administrative history of the case study area is also dwelt with in details in this chapter. The choice of this area for fieldwork was made because of the concentration of a large number of Bodo, Axamiyā and Koch people there. As the historical overview of the area shows, since pre-colonial times, there has been an overlap of administrative and political influences in the region, which has also been inhabited by communities of varied ethnic backgrounds. In fact, the demographic overlap has been such that when the BAC accord was drawn up in 1993, it failed precisely because no area under the proposed Bodoland region could meet the criteria set forth by the accord, namely that villages having 50% and more of tribal population which shall be included in the BAC. The result was that armed nativist militants went about trying to create the requisite majority by resorting to ethnic cleansing. The BTAD as a result, has been one of the politically most volatile zones of Assam and the most conflict prone.
Moreover, the Kamatapur imagination of the Koch-Rajbangsis and the political demand for a Bodo homeland have overlapping cartographies, and both fall within the case study area thus making it a fertile ground for the outbreak of sporadic violence. What is more, in the first place, the raison d’être of the area as an administrative unit is the protracted Axamiyā-Bodo conflict. It was created as a means to resolve that conflict – studying its current situation and internal problems would also help analyse the successes and shortcomings of the conflict resolution methods adopted by the State. It is therefore, the most suitable area for conducting fieldwork for the current research.
Most significantly, the chapter deals with the challenges involved in conducting fieldwork in a conflict zone. The researcher’s first visit to any place in the BTAD was in 2005 to the westernmost districts of Kokrajhar and Chirang. The national highway that bifurcates each of the two adjoining districts was often referred to locally as the ‘India-Pakistan border’ drawing a parallel with the sustained animosity between the two countries (field interviews). In this case, the parties at war were the NDFB and the ex-BLT cadres, many of whom as already discussed, retained their illegal firearms despite their official surrender. The sporadic violence was also accompanied by an atmosphere of constant political uncertainty and quotidian insecurity for the people on the streets. Free movement and meetings with the various actors are naturally restricted under such circumstances, and controlled by the depth of knowledge of the researcher about the nuances in local politics, the various players and factions involved in this politics, and her resourcefulness and ability to instill confidence among the subjects being interviewed, observed or analysed. Moreover, in a highly polarized conflict zone, where multiple actors are vying for legitimacy and control, the task of managing the various sponsors and gatekeepers of information becomes that much more difficult for the researcher.
In the course of fieldwork, this researcher set up base in Kokrajhar town which was the capital of the BTAD and largely controlled by the ex-BLT camp. She then made frequent excursions into the neighbouring areas, and sometimes inadvertently crossed over to the NDFB controlled side, mostly in the Bhutan foothills and in many cases, extremely isolated. Besides the suspicion of the Bodo political leaders and insurgents, this also managed to at times draw the attention of the local authorities – police officers and civil servants. But despite facing some amount of initial resistance, as the field visits continued over the years, interaction and acceptance became much easier. But the researcher had to always bear the responsibility to exercise caution not just for her personal well-bring and safety, but also that of her interviewees and informants. The researcher who is often not a permanent resident of the case study area can remove herself when confronted by a threat she cannot face. But her informants who do reside in the area are the ones who would have to face the consequences of any political faux pas or lapse of judgement – however naive – made by the researcher. She thus needs to be constantly aware of the ethics of fieldwork while working in a conflict zone.
It is not just the non-state armed actors can thus jeopardise the safety of the researcher and her informants in a conflict zone. In a highly militarized and sensitive area like Assam, and the Northeast as a whole, the State machinery and its various agencies are also equally wary of social researchers working in the region. In the process of the State’s covert counter-insurgency operations, the academic and researcher also gets implicated. Under the circumstances, how is one to collect data, question informants and collect testimonies without jeopardising the sources, or sacrificing independent functioning?
At the same time, in its continued covert operations against the militants, the State encourages co-option of the intellectuals on the one hand, while on the other, there are those who function as mouthpieces of the various insurgent factions and sacrifice the objectivity of social research. Such challenges to intellectual integrity apart, in a region where the security forces are given immunity under the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) and are known to have indulged with impunity in offenses ranging from extra-judicial killings to rape to petty crimes against civilians, individual safety is always at risk.
Under the circumstances then, one has to be extremely alert to the nuances of the conflicts being studied. To directly attribute most ethnic conflicts and cases of ethnic violence to inter-ethnic animosities and competitions can often leave the story only half told, or worse still, incorrectly told. In order to avoid this, the researcher must therefore be extremely well versed in the intricacies of the prevalent political climate, and avoid taking anything at face value. In the absence of such a consciousness, it is possible that errors might be made in conceptualising or theorising one’s research thesis itself.
There is always the danger of confounding categories and losing objectivity even in the early stage of conceptualising one’s research and approach to one’s subject of research. Especially, one needs to walk the intellectual tightrope while applying labels and categorising communities, something that cannot be done indiscriminately given the frequently shifting political equations.
Another closely allied problem in conceptualising the communities of Assam is the process of ‘retribalisation’ of ‘detribalised’ communities. It leaves the researcher with the challenge of engaging with changing self-definitions of communities and overlapping histories and conflicting political demands. It is essential that the researcher should have an extremely nuanced understanding of the temporal and spatial variations in such self-definitions and demands. It is nothing but the lack of a similarly nuanced understanding among the political activists and community leaders that had led to the conflagration of ethnic conflicts in Assam.

Before Conflicts: Identity and Nationality Formation in Assam

Chapter 3 deals with the nature of the Axamiyā identity by exploring the various forces – geographic, demographic, historical and cultural that went into its formation. Located at ‘one of the great migration routes of mankind’, Assam and the Northeast as a whole saw diverse racial elements pass through it, all of which left their cultural remnants and contributed to the ethnic composition of the people. Through an amalgamation of Aryan influences from the west and non-Aryan influences from the east, a unique interethnic identity – the Axamiyā identity – had begun to take shape in Assam, one that was ‘less dualistic and more synergistic’. It allowed for individuation of the many communities living in the land while it was itself the end product of the universalization of their identities.
With the coming of the colonial rulers however, there also came a break with Axamiyā inter-ethnicity. Certain colonial administrative policies and socio-economic factors were responsible for setting into motion this process and Chapter 4 discusses in details how they institutionalized markers of ethnic difference, introduced ideas of territorial exclusivity and laid the foundations of settler-indigenous conflicts that introduced the conflict-inducing outsider-insider rhetoric. At the same time, the fathers of the Axamiyā nation building process began to advocate more and more the ‘assimilationist melting pot model’ which was in reality nothing but another form of mono-culturalism being gradually introduced into the discourse. Chapter 4 also discusses two major influences that were responsible for this. The first was the influence of neighboring Bengal where most of the Axamiyā elite and nascent middle class was being educated and indoctrinated into western ideology. Bengali nationalism which had nearly had a century’s head start over Axamiyā nationalism to shape itself in opposition to British imperialism was shaping itself along monolithic lines. At the same time, the pioneers of the Axamiyā nation building exercise were keen to shape Axamiyā as a sub-nation of the great Indian nationality. In order to do so, they began identifying Axamiyā more and more with the Aryan elements in its make-up. The identity was thus hijacked by one section of the people at the cost of Axamiyā inter-ethnicity when individual ethnic groups began regressing toward re-identifying with their origins. The result was marginalization and identity conflicts.

Ethnic Fragmentation, State Policy and Conflict

The fallout of the breakup of the Axamiyā interethnic identity was twofold: for one, it prompted the ethnic components of the Axamiyā identity to dissociate themselves from the Axamiyā label, and secondly, the Axamiyā identity itself came in for a change of definition. Hijacked as it was by the Axamiyā Hindu middle class, it came to be associated more and more with this particular community alone, alienating the other communities from its fold. The result, as already mentioned, was conflicts between communities. These conflicts however, did not erupt overnight; neither did the process of redefinition of identities unfold in one decisive stroke. Many factors, historical, geo-political and socio-cultural, contributed towards this. Chapter 5 and 6 go into these factors in details while analyzing the phenomenon of fragmentation at various levels.
Chapter 5 explores how co-existence gave way to competition when opposition to colonial rule began and the possibility of grasping political power under a new, postcolonial dispensation surfaced. With one particular community assuming sole ownership of the Axamiyā label and hence the right to predominate in postcolonial Assam, the other component communities also felt the need to reclaim their distinctive place within the new nation state in the making. This process assumed different meanings, followed different trajectories and adopted different methods. This chapter discusses all these aspects with relation to the case study communities – Bodo and Koch – as they continued on their path of dissociation with the Axamiyā nation. The factors that facilitated or problematised the process of ethnic fragmentation are also considered here.
Chapter 6 explores the new self-definitions that these communities were gradually fashioning for themselves. These were after all, the grounds on which the ethnic fragmentations were taking place and owing to which the ‘post’-colonial conflicts in Assam all took place. The State policies that facilitated and/or instigated such fragmentation and alienation among communities are discussed here. It looks at policies relating to language, ethnicity, land and livelihood among others to explore how the State’s approach to the ethnic aspirations of these communities went beyond merely creating fissures and actually exacerbated conflicts between them. The morphology of these conflicts is also simultaneously traced.

Ethnic Conflicts, Insurgency and Militarization: State Responses

One of the major fallouts of the ethnic conflicts prevalent in Assam was the proliferation of armed insurgent movements. Aggressive in the extreme, armed militancy is seen by almost all ethnic communities of Assam as the only means of ethnic preservation and assertion by winning a share of the power and resources. Chapters 7 and 8 explore how the Indian State has addressed ethnic aspirations and managed the resultant conflicts and insurgent movements of Assam. The measures taken to resolve these conflicts are analyzed for their effectiveness and the argument is put forward that these measures of conflict resolution have in fact led to an exacerbation of conflicts in more ways than one.
These chapters argue that the Indian State has relied heavily upon Western traditional methods of conflict management in addressing the ethnic conflicts of Assam and the Northeast in general. At the same time, however, it has also tempered its engagement with the conflicts in the region with the traditional Indian model of diplomacy advocated by the great statesman, Kautilya. This model is based on the four principles of sham (conciliation), dam (monetary inducement), danda (use of force) and bhed (division, fragmentation). The result has been successful containment of the conflicts to a large extent. On more instances than one, it has also led to the co-option of certain actors and agents involved in the conflicts as well as to the dilution of the conflict intensity and goals. It has however, failed to transform the conflicts in any meaningful way that would address the final goals of any real conflict resolution/transformation effort. Rather, as Chapter 7 illustrates, it has led to a legitimization of violence in society and a brutalization of both the State’s armed forces and the militant groups. The main reason for this is that through large scale militarization and legislations sanctioning military oppression, the State has been aiming to control the most violent manifestation of ethnic conflicts – that is, armed militancy. The root causes of conflict have remained unaddressed. If anything, they have been strengthened and conflict exacerbated.
Chapter 8 shows how at times, entire sections of the political and civil society leadership have been similarly co-opted with monetary inducements and the promise of participation in power-sharing arrangements. Opposition and protests are curbed using the Kautilyan principles and new power centers are created. A fresh set of ethnic elites are installed in these new centers and they continue perpetuating the same old ethnic hierarchies and perpetrating the same old policies of suppressing ethnic aspirations, thus keeping alive the cycle of violence and conflict. Negotiations are held and peace accords and instruments of settlements are signed by the State with the conflict party but only as an extension of this policy of co-option. As a result, discords follow the signing of most of these accords. The nature and extent of the autonomy granted to ethnic groups under these accords and the policy changes – if any – made in response to them are also brought to doubt. Thus, while the conflict management approaches adopted by the State leave many negative effects on the conflict scenario, there are also many problems inherent in the instruments of conflict settlement and resolution that the State has adopted/adapted so far.

Transforming Conflicts, Invoking Tradition

Chapter 9 argues that the State needs to revisit its approach towards the ethnic aspirations of the various communities in Assam. Kautilyan principles of realpolitik can only contain conflicts and maybe temporarily settle them. However, they have not brought the Indian State anywhere within sight of long-term conflict resolution or transformation. Rather, fissures have been created in the society – between the elite and those at the grassroots, between ethnic communities and between factions of the same community. It has also failed address structural violence in society and failed to invest in attitudinal changes, fostering new relations and developing a culture of peace. At the same time, those who are affected by conflict and have to live with the peace arrangement devised for them by the State have also failed to take ownership of the tenuous peace that despite all the odds, does make itself manifest from time to time. This chapter also then puts forward certain prescriptions for overcoming these gaps in conflict transformation and peace building.
Chapter 10 concludes the study by arguing that one need not always look back at the past through the lenses of conflict – there are various lessons to be learnt in the past and through revisiting certain traditions and traditional practices also, conflict transformation can be effected. It points out that the basis for conflict transformation, ethnic reconciliation and peacebuilding as a whole have always been present in Assam history and in the interethnic Axamiyā ethos. It co-relates the inspirations from the past with certain prescriptions for the future, and it does so while weighing them against contemporary thinking in the field of conflict transformation.


[1] The label ‘autochthonous’ is used here for all communities that claim to be ‘sons of the soil’ of Assam. Communities such as the Ahom and the Axamiyā-speaking Hindus and Muslims are considered non-indigenous autochthons to distinguish them from the many ‘tribal’ communities or indigenous autochthons of the region. The onset of colonial rule is generally taken as the dividing line determining which populations are autochthonous and which are settlers.